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In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric 
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In multi unit organizations, with externalities (the choices made by one
unit affect the profit of the others), two key factors will drive the task allo-
cation problem: externalities and asymmetric information. In the absence of
externalities, there is no need to coordinate agents’ choices and profit is max-
imized in a fully decentralized structure where the agents have all the power.
In the absence of asymmetric information, there is no reason to delegate and
profit is maximized in a centralized organization where the principal keeps
all the power. In an organization where there are both externalities and
asymmetric information, benefits and costs are associated with delegation.
In a single period interaction, delegation is beneficial because the decider
has superior information (Dessein, 2002). With repeated interaction, dele-
gation has an additional benefit: the principal can improve her knowledge
of the agents’ information by observing their past decisions (Gautier and
Paolini, 2007). Delegation is a learning process: when the agent uses his
private information to make better decision, the principal revises her beliefs
by observing the agent’s choice and she can improve her decisions.
We model a two-period interaction between one principal supervising two
agents (units). At each period, a project must be implemented in each unit.
At time zero, the principal chooses the process of decision-making for the
following periods. Projects are transferable control actions (Aghion et al.,
2002): projects cannot be contracted out but control is contractible. Each
agent has a piece of private information and he exerts an externality on the
other. In this context, the questions we raise in this paper are which decisions
should be decentralized and when?
To answer the second question (’when?’), we build up on Gautier and
Paolini (2007) that have shown that, in a repeated set-up, an agent discloses
his private information when he receives control over the first decision. We
show that this result continues to hold true in a multi agents setting where
there are multiple sources of information. Hence, optimal decentralization
within the organization remains limited to the first period. The answer to
the first question (’which’?) is the main contribution of this paper. We show
that delegation is limited across agents. Even though the principal acquires
information, delegation remains costly because the agents do not take the
externalities into account. Moreover, the benefit of an additional piece of
information decreases because information is partly redundant. Hence, the
number of delegated decisions depends on the quality of the signal produced
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and on the cost of producing it. The quality of the signal depends on the
correlation between the information of the agents. The cost of producing
a signal, which is the cost of delegating decisions, depends on the external-
ity exerted by the agent that receives the control over decisions. Following
that, symmetric agents could be treated differently in the organization if one
signal, obtained by the delegation of a decision to one agent, brings enough
information to the principal.
2. The Model
There are three players, the principal and two agents (units) l = A,B,
and two periods t = 1, 2. Before the first period, the principal decides who
will have the power to choose the project (dlt) in unit l at time t. In each
period a project is implemented by both units.
Each agent l has private information represented by a state parameter θl
drawn out of a set Θ = {θ1, θ2} with θ1 < θ2 and ∆θ= θ2 − θ1.
The principal only knows the prior distribution of (θA, θB) over Θ × Θ,
which is represented by a joint probability distribution {v11, v12, v21, v22}
where vij = prob(θA = θi, θB = θj). The correlation between θ’s can be mea-
sured by ρ = |v11v22 − v12v21|. To simplify, we assume that: v11 = v22 = vii
and v12 = v21 = vij. Then, ρ=|vii − 14 | and it takes a value between 0 (inde-
pendence) and 14 (perfect correlation).
The projects differ in just one dimension and there is a continuum of
possible decisions: dlt ∈ (0,+∞). Each unit is a profit center. Depending
on θl, there is one project maximizing profit in unit l. The profit in unit l




unit’s profit is maximized for dlt = α
l + θl and it decreases with the distance
between the preferred project and the actual one.
In addition, unit l exerts an externality on unit k. The externality is
measured by a parameter γ, identical for the two units. A decision dlt taken
in unit l reduces the profit in unit k by γdlt.
The profit in unit l is thus:






− γ(dk1 + dk2),
with l %= k.
The agents maximize the profit in their unit while the principal is inter-
ested in the maximization of the total profit (maximized for dlt = α
l+θl−γ).
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3. Decisions of the principal and the agents
Each decision dlt is made by the person to whom the principal has al-
located the right to decide. When the principal must decide on a project
dlt, her decision depends on the information she has. Let us represent her
information by a distribution of beliefs ηij over Θ×Θ. The decision dlt that
maximizes total profit is:
dlt = α
l + E(θl | ηij)− γ,
where E(θl | ηij) denotes the expected value of θl conditional on beliefs ηij.
When agent l must decide on a project dlt, he must take into account
that the principal will revise her beliefs after observing dlt. This changes the
agents’ profit if the principal can make a decision after the agent i.e. only if




2 is not. If the principal cannot use the agent’s
information, the agent chooses his preferred project dlt = (α
l+θl). In all other
cases, the agents and the principal play a signaling game and we must search
for equilibria. Usually, signaling games have multiple equilibria. We use Cho
and Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion (IC) to refine the set of equilibria. We
can establish that:
Proposition 1 Under delegation of dl1, the only equilibrium that survives IC
is the least costly separating (LCS) equilibrium.1
Proof. See appendix.
Gautier and Paolini (2007) have proved this result in the one principal -
one agent case. Here, we show that the structure of preferences is such that
the result extends to the one principal - two agents case. That is, whatever
the principal’s knowledge of the state parameters, there always exist one state
in which the agent would be better off if he manages to transmit the true
information to the principal i.e. the single crossing property holds true for
all possible information structure. Consequently, a separating equilibrium
always exists. Moreover, the IC selects the most efficient one among the
non-empty set of separating equilibria. This means that, if the principal
delegates dl1 to agent l, she learns θ
l and improves her knowledge of θk. Both
second period decisions are thus based on a more accurate information.
To transmit information to the principal, the agents must sometimes take
a suboptimal decision to make their information transfer credible i.e. the
1The Riley (1979) outcome.
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decisions that maximize the agent’s payoff may not be incentive compatible.
Our corollary clarifies that point.
Corollary 2 If ∆θ2 ≥ γ2, the LCS equilibrium is dl1(θ) = αl + θl.
Notice that, whenever this condition does not hold true, the principal
optimally retains control over all decisions (proposition 3 hereafter).
4. Optimal organization
Given that there is an externality between the two units, any form of
delegation has a cost for the principal because there is no coordination in
the project choices. Nevertheless, delegation benefits the principal because
(i) the decisions of the agents are based on better information than those
of the principal and (ii) the principal improves her knowledge of the state
parameter after observing delegated decisions. In this section, we derive the
optimal organization.
Starting from a fully centralized organization. The principal bases her
decisions on the expected value of θl rather than on its true value. But the
principal internalizes the externalities imposed by one agent to the other.




l + (vii + vij)θ
l
1 + (vij + vii)θ
l
2 − γ (1)
Next, consider partial delegation where the principal delegates dl1 to
agent l and retains control over the remaining decisions. If dl1 signals θ
l
to the principal (and we know form proposition 1 that it is the case), the
principal becomes informed about θl but also improves her information about
θk, k %= l if there is correlation between the information. Under the condition





l + θl (3)
dk2 = α
k + E(θk | θl)− γ (4)
dl2(θ) = α
l + θl − γ (5)
With one signal obtained by delegating dl1, the principal implements the
first best in period 2 for agent l and bases her decision dk2 on a better infor-
mation than the prior distribution of θk.
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With full delegation, the decisions implemented in unit l are given by
(3) and (5) and the decisions implemented in unit k are given by
dk1(θ) = α
k + θk (6)
dk2(θ) = α
k + θk − γ (7)
Let us denote by ΠC , ΠPD and ΠD, the principal’s profit under central-
ization (C), partial delegation (PD) and full delegation (D). Starting from
the profit ΠC , we can define the marginal benefit of delegation. The marginal
benefit of delegating a first project to agent l is equal to Mb(1) = ΠPD−ΠC .
Simple computation gives that delegating one project amounts to a change
of total profit equals to Mb(1) = −γ2 + 12(1 + 8ρ2)∆θ2.
If the principal delegates a second project to agent k, the principal be-
comes informed about θl and θk. We can thus define the marginal benefit of
delegating a second decision as Mb(2) = ΠD −ΠPD = −γ2 + 12(1− 8ρ2)∆θ2.
Hence, if Mb(1) > 0, the total profit increases if dl1 is delegated to agent
l. Likewise, if Mb(2) > 0, both first period projects must be delegated to the
agents. Clearly, Mb(1) ≥ Mb(2), that is the marginal benefit of delegating
a first project is higher than the marginal benefit of delegating a second one
because the information contained in a second signal is partially redundant
(at least for ρ > 0). Therefore, ifMb(1) > 0 > Mb(2), the principal optimally
delegates to only one agent.
Finally, notice that under the condition of our corollary, we have Mb(3),
Mb(4) < 0, which means that second period delegation would never be opti-
mal. We thus have established the following:
Proposition 3 The optimal organization is: centralization for ∆θ2 ≤ 2γ21+8ρ2 ,
delegation of dl1 to agent l for ∆θ
2 ∈ [ 2γ21+8ρ2 , 2γ
2
1−8ρ2 ] and delegation of d
A
1 and
dB1 to A and B for ∆θ
2 ≥ 2γ21−8ρ2 .
The striking result of this paper is the optimality of limited delegation
in a repeated context. Delegation is limited to the first period (Gautier
and Paolini, 2007) and across agents. Agents can be treated asymmetrically
within the organization. The principal selects one delegate that will be re-
sponsible for the production of the signal and keeps control over the decisions
concerning the other agent.
The quality of the signal produced by the agent depends on the degree
of correlation. Mb(1) is increasing in ρ: when the information are correlated
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the value of a unique signal is higher. Conversely, Mb(2) decreases in ρ :
the informational content of the second signal decreases with the degree of
correlation. Figure 1 illustrates the optimal organizational structure as a
function of the correlation parameter. Asymmetric treatment of the agents
is more likely when the agents have correlated information. Note also that
in a one period model, there is no learning associated with delegation and
agents will be treated symmetrically.
In this model, we have analyzed a dynamic task allocation problem with
externalities and asymmetric information. An alternative mechanism could
be that the agents communicate to the principal and the principal chooses the
actions. Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that communication is not perfectly
informative. In a message game both agents reveal their private information
to the principal who then takes all decisions if 4γ2 ≤ ∆θ2. Clearly there exists
a parameter set where communication fails and delegation is optimal. This
confirms Dessein (2002) who recognizes that ”Delegation is typically a better















Mb(1) > Mb(2) > 0
Mb(1) > 0 > Mb(2)
Figure 1: Optimal organization
Appendix: Proof of proposition 1 and corollary 2
In a two-players game, IC selects the Riley outcome if there are only two
states and if the payoff function satisfies the single crossing condition. To
prove proposition 1, we replicate the argument (used in Gautier and Paolini,
2007) in this three-players game.
Each agent when he receives control over d1 plays a signaling game with
the principal. But, two versions of this game must be considered: in the
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first, the other agent k discloses his private information and thus, at t = 2,
the principal knows θk. In the second, the principal does not learn θk either
because the agent decided not disclose information or because he did not
receive control over dk1.
In this game played between l and the principal, a Bayesian equilibrium
is a triple (d∗1, d
∗
2, µ) where:
(BE1) ∀θ ∈ Θ, d∗1(θ) ∈ argmaxd1 Πl(d1, d∗2, θ)
(BE2) ∀d∗1, d∗2(θ) ∈ argmaxd2
∑
θ µ(θ|d1)ΠP (d1, d∗2, θ)
(BE3) The posterior beliefs µ(θ|d1) are consistent with the Baye’s rule.
We apply to the set of Bayesian equilibria the Cho and Kreps (1987) intuitive
criterion. A Bayesian equilibrium fails the intuitive criterion if:
(IC1) The equilibrium payoff of the agent in one state of the world (θi) is
greater with the equilibrium strategy than with any other strategy.
(IC2) It exists a strategy d˜1 such that the equilibrium payoffs in the other
state of the world (θj) are smaller than those with the strategy d˜1 once the
principal is convinced that d˜1 could not have been chosen by the agent in
state θi.
(1) Suppose that agent k truly reveals his private information if he con-
trols dk1. Then, whatever the choice of d
l
1 by agent l, he will not be able
to change the principal’s belief about θk. In this game, the standard sort-
ing condition is satisfied; This is sufficient to kill all the pooling and the
separating equilibria but the Riley outcome.
To be more explicit, consider first the set separating equilibria. In a
separating equilibrium d∗2(θ) = α
l + θ; an equilibrium is separating if d∗1(θ)
satisfies the incentive constraint:
Πl(d∗1(θ), d
∗
2(θ), θ) ≥ Πl(d∗1(θ˜), d∗2(θ˜), θ) (8)
The equilibrium is supported by pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs:
µ(θ1|d1 %= d∗1(θ2)) = 1. Then, d∗1(θ1) = αl + θ1 and the set of d∗(θ2) that
satisfies the constraint (8) is the set D of separating equilibria. Applied to
the set D, the intuitive criterion refines all the out-of-equilibrium beliefs:
µ(θ2|d1 ∈ D) = 1. Hence, a rational agent selects the decision dl1(θ2) that
maximizes his profit under constraint (8) i.e selects his preferred decision
within D. And the only separating equilibrium that survives the intuitive
criterion is the least costly separating equilibrium (Riley outcome). Last,
note that αl + θ2 ∈ D if ∆θ2 ≥ (γk)2.
Consider any pooling equilibrium where d∗1(θ1) = d
∗
1(θ2). In state θ2, the
agent is worse-off than when he can signal his type. Then, we can associate
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with any pooling equilibrium a decision d˜1 such that:
(IC1) In state θ1, the agent prefers the pooling equilibrium to d˜1, whatever
the beliefs associated with d˜1
(IC2) In state θ2, the agent prefers d˜1 to the pooling equilibrium if the prin-
cipal is convinced that µ(θ1|d˜1) = 0.
If in state θ1 the agent never deviates to d˜1, the intuitive criterion imposes
that the beliefs associated with d˜1 change to µ(θ2|d˜1) = 1. Consequently, the
agent will quit the pool in state θ2 and no pooling equilibria will survive the
intuitive criterion.
(2) Suppose that agent k does not disclose his private information at
period one either because he does not control dk1 or because he plays a pooling
equilibrium. In this case, disclosing the value of θl changes the principal’s
beliefs on both θl and θk. We must then identify the state θi in which the
agent has no incentive to hide his private information (if it exists).
If agent l plays a pooling equilibrium, the second period decisions are:
dk2 = α
k + θ1+θ22 − γ, k = A,B. If, in state θi, the agent manages to signal
his type, the second period decisions change to: dl2 = α
l + θi − γ and dk2 =
αk+viiθi+vijθj−γ, i, j = 1, 2. We must show that there exists a state θi ∈ Θ
in which the agent has would prefer to inform the principal. Replacing the
decisions in the profit functions, we can show that such a state always exists.
Then, we can use the same reasoning as above to eliminate all the pooling.
If agent l plays a separating equilibrium, the second period decisions are:
dl2(θi) = α
l + θi − γ and dk2 = αk + viiθi + vijθj − γ. If, in state θi, the agent
deviates, he changes the second period decisions to: dl2 = α
l + θj − γ and
dk2 = α
k + vijθi + viiθj − γ, i, j = 1, 2. We must show that there exists at
most one state θi ∈ Θ in which such a deviation is profitable. Replacing the
decisions in the profit functions, we can show that indeed, deviating cannot
be profitable in both states. Hence, we have our standard sorting conditions.
We can thus find the set of separating equilibria and apply the same reasoning
as above to select the most efficient one.
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